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Abstract
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or, the Court) is a formidable player 
in the development of legal approaches to Islam: its jurisdictional remit (covering 
over 800 million people across 47 countries) is vast; it is a standard setter for human 
rights protection in general on a global scale; and it has a rapidly growing body of 
case law relevant to Islam which has influenced states’ engagements with Islam within 
Europe and beyond. Besides the Court’s ‘direct effects’, in terms of impact on relevant 
legislation, through its decisions to do with Islam, it also has a significant ‘indirect’, 
social effect though the messages those decisions communicate about Islam and its place 
in society. This contribution examines the role of the Court in its direct and indirect 
effects on Islam, law and Europeanisation.
In the broader context of attention to Islam, law and Europeanisation, a consideration 
of the role played by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or, the Court) is 
worthwhile for two main reasons. First, the Court has dealt with a number of cases to 
do with Islam, and in so doing has helped to shape national legal approaches to Islam 
in many of the countries within its ambit. The Court has engaged with a broad range 
of relevant topics, from the rights of Muslims to wear religious dress in schools and in 
the workplace, and the right to religious autonomy of Muslim minority communities 
living in Christian majority contexts, to the right to exemption claimed by Muslim 
parents from mixed-gender physical education and swimming classes in the public 
education systems. And, of course, the great geographic breadth of its jurisdictional 
remit (covering over 800 million people across the 47 member states of the Council of 
Europe, under the auspices of which the Court functions), together with the fact that 
any right won in one of these country contexts is automatically a right to which any 
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individual in other member state may lay claim, render the ECtHR a formidable player 
in the development of legal approaches to Islam.  
A second main reason to consider the role of the ECtHR is because of the ‘messages’ 
the Court communicates about Islam through its judgements (Fokas and Richardson 
2018). As established through a rich body of socio-legal scholarship, though the ‘direct 
effects’ of courts referred to above, in terms of impacting on legal change in the contexts 
in which the rights claims are made in each case, are important, consideration of 
courts’ direct effects tells only a very small part of the story of courts’ broader potential 
impact on the issues they address. In the words of Marc Galanter, who pioneered in 
the study of courts’ ‘indirect’ or ‘radiating effects’ (1981, 1983), ‘courts resolve only a 
small fraction of all disputes that are brought to their attention. These are only a small 
fraction of the disputes that might conceivably be brought to court and an even smaller 
fraction of the whole universe of disputes’ (1981: 3). He thus indicates that because of 
such limitations on courts’ ‘direct effects’, 
The social effects they produce by communication must be far more 
important than the direct effects of the relatively few decisions they 
render. Law is more capacious as a system of cultural and symbolic 
meanings than as a set of operative controls (emphasis mine; 1981:13). 
From this ‘decentered’ perspective, the impact of courts on disputes is accomplished 
more extensively through the dissemination of information: ‘Courts produce not only 
decisions, but messages. These messages are resources that parties use in envisioning, 
devising, pursuing, negotiating, vindicating claims (and in avoiding, defending, and 
defeating them)’ (Galanter 1983: 126). Such ‘indirect effects’ of courts, then, entail the 
impact of their ‘messages’ communicated through their judgements on societies at large 
and, more specifically, on peoples’ perceptions of their rights, the discourse about their 
rights and their pursuit of their rights, whether through legal or political (e.g., lobbying) 
means.
Thus this contribution examines the role of the Court in its direct and indirect effects 
on Islam, law and Europeanisation. It begins with attention to the main relevant articles 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which the ECtHR interprets. 
It then offers an overview of the ECtHR’s Islam-related case law, necessarily schematic 
due to space limitations but detailed enough to give a broad sense of the contours of 
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that case law. A third main section will consider three major lines of scholarly criticism 
of the Court in its engagements with Islam, followed by attention to the ‘new kid on 
the block’ – the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) – and its recent entry 
into the field of religious rights. The articles closes with reflections on the messages 
communicated by the ECtHR through its case law related to Islam.
Bases of relevant case law in European Convention on Human 
Rights articles
A collection of five ECHR articles may be identified as those most actively applied 
to religion-related case law in general, and to Islam-related case law specifically. The 
first and most conspicuous of these is Article 9 on the ‘Freedom of Religion or Belief ’, 
which is divided into two clauses, the first of which protects the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, including the right to change and to manifest one’s beliefs, 
alone or in community with others. Whilst there are no limitations on the freedom 
of belief, the second clause of Article 9 sets out potential grounds for limitations on 
the freedom to manifest religion or belief, indicating that such limitations must be 
‘prescribed by law and … necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, and for the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others’. In the first case in which the Court issued a judgement 
finding a state in violation of religious freedom (Kokkinakis v. Greece, 1993), the Court 
expressed what can now be understood as its mantra on the freedom of religion or 
belief; this mantra can be found in the majority of cases henceforth which engage that 
right. It reads:
As enshrined in Article 9 (art. 9), freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is one of the foundations of a ‘democratic society’ within the 
meaning of the Convention.   It is, in its religious dimension, one of 
the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers 
and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, 
agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable 
from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, 
depends on it. (para. 31) 
Other ECHR articles frequently invoked in cases somehow involving Islam, often 
in conjunction with Art.9, are Articles 10, 11, 14, and Article 2 of the 1st Protocol 
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to the Convention.  Article 10 protects the Freedom of Expression, which includes 
the ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.  As in the case 
of the freedom to manifest one’s belief, so too the freedom of expression includes 
limitations ‘in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for 
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of 
the judiciary’. 
A third article of the Convention much engaged by conscience-based groups in their 
claims against states in which they reside is Article 11, on the Freedom of assembly 
and association. Like articles 9 and 10, the right is not absolute, and is subject to 
restrictions to do with national security, public safety, prevention of crime and disorder 
and protection of health, morals and the rights of others. In all, of the restrictions set 
out on the rights expounded in Articles 9, 10 and 11, ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
and ‘public order’ feature most frequently in the ECtHR’s judgements entailing Islam-
related rights limitations. In some cases, as we shall see, it is rather striking how elastic 
these notions can be when used to defend Muslims’ rights limitations.
A further ECHR article which features in a great deal of ECtHR case law involving a 
Islam is Article 14, which prohibits discrimination on several bases, including religion 3. 
Finally, Article 2 of the first Protocol to the Convention guarantees the right to 
education and the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching ‘in conformity 
with their own religious and philosophical convictions’. Neither of these two articles 
include, in the text of the Convention, any formal limitations on the rights guaranteed 
therein.
Islam-related ECtHR case law: broad themes
Islam-related claims arise before the ECtHR under a broad range of themes. This is 
not an exhaustive list but, as indicated above, it is sufficient for presenting the contours 
of the ECtHR’s engagements with Islam and Muslims’ rights claims. The themes are 
3 Note bene: Art.14 may be invoked by the Court only in conjunction with other ECHR articles; 
i.e., discrimination in the enjoyment of any particular right secured by the ECHR is what 
Art.14 protects against.
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presented roughly chronologically, based on when the first judgement relevant to each 
was delivered. This ordering of the material is to give a sense of how the case law has 
evolved over time 4.   
In order to present the scholarly criticism of the Court’s handling of Islam-related cases, 
in the following section a selection of these cases is presented in greater depth. The 
selection focuses on cases to do with religious dress, e.g., the headscarf or burqa ban, 
and mainly but not exclusively on those which have been heavily criticised.  These are 
either ‘problem cases’ in and of themselves, or problematic in relation to one another. 
Together, they help tell a broader story about the ECtHR in relation to Islam.  
Religious autonomy
The first several cases arising before the Court involving Islam had to do with religious 
autonomy and the right of religious groups to self-determination (within, always, the 
limitations set out above). For example, in a series of cases against the state of Greece 
(Serif v. Greece 1999, and Agga v. Greece 1-4, 2000-2006), the Greek government 
was faulted for interferences in the selection of muftis for the Muslim communities in 
the region of Thrace. The same issue is addressed in the cases of Hasan and Chaush v. 
Bulgaria (2000), and Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria 
(2004). Thus in its early engagements with Islam the ECtHR tended mainly to 
questions of Muslim minority communities’ right to freedom from interference from 
the states in which they are based.
Religious dress 
A second and the largest body of cases relevant to Islam addressed here has to do with 
religious dress – mainly the headscarf and mainly in educational settings, of teachers 
and students. In Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001) the Swiss state was called to defend 
itself against the claim of a primary school teacher who was not allowed to teach with 
her headscarf, in spite of no complaints from the students or parents about the latter, 
because the headscarf was deemed a ‘powerful religious symbol’ which might impinge 
on the young students’ freedom of conscience. Ms. Dahlab was a convert to Islam 
hired before that conversion, and taught wearing the headscarf for 3-4 years without 
4 It should be noted however that dates somehow arbitrary though in this context, because 
the months or years between the date a case is filed by complainant and the date a decision 
is delivered may be wholly different from one case to the other. All cases can be found on 
the Court’s database at www.hudoc.eu.
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complaint by her students or parents of the latter. In Dahlab, the Court dismissed 
the case as inadmissible, but the case remains an important element in the Court’s 
engagement with Islam because of statements the Court made in its inadmissibility 
decision regarding the meaning and impact of the headscarf, statements which made 
their way into other later case law. Specifically, in Dahlab the Court determined that
… it is very difficult to assess the impact that a powerful external 
symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of 
conscience and religion of very young children … it cannot be denied 
outright that the wearing of a headscarf might have some kind of 
proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be imposed on women by a 
precept which is laid down in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court 
noted, is hard to square with the principle of gender equality. It therefore 
appears difficult to reconcile the wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the 
message of tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-
discrimination (Dahlab v. Switzerland, p.13)
There are three key elements in particular to the Court’s reasoning which we see 
repeated in later judgments: 1. The headscarf is a ‘powerful external symbol’ which 
might have a proselytizing effect; 2. The headscarf is incompatible with gender equality, 
and 3. The headscarf is incompatible with tolerance and respect for others. Overall the 
judgement communicates a rather negative message about Islam: the wearing of the 
headscarf may have a proselytizing effect, the judgement suggests, specifically because 
‘it appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran’. 
As such, the Court argues, the wearing of the headscarf is contrary to a. tolerance, 
b. respect for others, and c. equality and non-discrimination. The conceptual leaps 
are significant here, and they are not much moderated by the ‘softening’ language of 
‘might have’ and ‘appears to be’ used by the Court. Rather to the contrary, with such 
broadsweeping claims being made, one would expect evidence to be offered and precise 
rather than fuzzy wording.
Likewise in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (2005), the Court deemed that the Turkish state 
was not violating the religious freedom of a university student when she was banned 
from sitting her university exams wearing a headscarf. In Sahin, the Court ruled that 
interference with right of a university student to wear headscarf to sit her exams was 
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justified because it had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the 
rights and freedom of others and protecting public order. Specifically, the Court stated: 
‘In such a context, where the values of pluralism, respect for the rights 
of others and, in particular, equality before the law of men and women 
are being taught and applied in practice, it is understandable that the 
relevant authorities should wish to preserve the secular nature of the 
institution concerned and so consider it contrary to such values to allow 
religious attire, including, as in the present case, the Islamic headscarf, to 
be worn’. 
In short, the Court emphasized the importance – in the Turkish context where the 
state is formally secular - of preserving secularism, gender equality, and the rights of 
others, because elsewhere in the judgment it indicates: ‘it must be borne in mind the 
impact which wearing such a symbol, which is presented or perceived as a compulsory 
religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it’. Thus similarly with 
the Dahlab decision, the Court expresses concern regarding the impact on others of 
a woman wearing a headscarf, though – rather critically – it  does not discriminate 
between the potential impact on young school children, on the one hand, and fellow 
university students, on the other. As such, this decision too communicates negative and 
essentialized notions of harm caused by the wearing of Islamic religious dress. 
The Sahin judgment is amongst the most vehemently contested and criticized religious 
freedoms judgments of the ECtHR.One such criticism comes from within the Court 
itself, in the form of a dissenting opinion by Judge Francoise Tulkens. Tulkens describes 
the judgment as an expression of paternalism, as far as the gender equality argument 
goes. ‘I fail to see’, she notes, ‘how the principle of sexual equality can justify prohibiting 
a woman from following a practice which [she says she has] freely adopted…’. Likewise, 
Professor Jeremy Gunn highlights irony in the case: ‘[w]e would not normally expect a 
human rights tribunal to be more solicitous of the sensibilities of those who do not like 
religious expression (which is not guaranteed by the European Convention) than of the 
right to manifest religion (which is guaranteed by the Convention)’ (Gunn 2012: 133). 
Sahin is particularly noteworthy because it is the first Grand Chamber decision on the 
issue of religious clothing.
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Kervanci v. France and Dogru v. France (2008) are cases brought before the ECtHR by 
Muslim students in the French education system claiming that mandatory participation 
students in physical education which did not allow the wearing of the headscarf 
violated their right to manifest their belief; their claim was not vindicated by the Court. 
(Notably, though decided in 2008, these cases arose prior to the 2004 general ban on 
headscarves in schools; a string of cases later challenging that ban (Singh et al. 2009, 
etc.) was declared inadmissible by the ECtHR).  
Arslan and others v. Turkey (2010) concerned 127 Turkish nationals convicted for 
wearing religious clothing in public other than for religious ceremonies; Arslan was at 
that time exceptional as a religious dress case in that the Court did find a violation.  The 
Court noted that, unlike several other religious dress cases it had decided, the applicants 
here were punished for their religious dress in public areas that were open to all, rather 
than in public establishments where the state’s interest in religious neutrality might 
outweigh the individual’s right to manifest his/her religion. Thus the Court explicitly 
stated that it saw no basis for defending a general ban on religious dress in public spaces. 
The Court further noted that it might have accepted that strict maintenance of a secular 
system was important for Turkey’s democracy and public safety, but that the Turkish 
judicial decisions at issue had failed to rely on that justification. 
In so doing it presaged its judgement in the much better-known case of S.A.S. v France 
(2014), which also concerned the ban on religious dress (in this case, the full face 
covering of the burqa), from all public spaces. Here the Court exchanged its earlier 
resistance to a general ban in public spaces in favour of the French state’s argument that 
such a ban was justifiable in the interest of ‘living together’. S.A.S. claimed violation 
of her religious freedom after France passed the 2010 ban on full-face covering in all 
public spaces (except religious ones) across the country. She emphasised that it was 
her choice to wear the veil, in efforts to override arguments about women’s rights and 
gender equality as those made in Dahlab and Sahin. That aspect of S.A.S.’s position 
was supported by a third party intervention from the Human Rights Center at the 
University of Ghent, led by Eva Brems, the language of which intervention factored 
prominently in the Court’s final judgment, in spite of, however, its ultimate acceptance 
of the French state’s defense based on the principle of ‘living together 5. The S.A.S. 
5 See the aforementioned Third Party Intervention at https://hrc.ugent.be/wp-content/up-
loads/2019/10/SAS.pdf, and the text of the Court’s judgement at https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng#{“itemid”:[“001-145466”]}. 
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judgement may be interpreted as an expression of the Court’s tendency to protect 
state secularism, as in the Turkish cases also, as both countries are constitutionally-
determined secular states. Rather controversially though, in Belkacemi and Oussar v. 
Belgium and Dakir v. Belgium (2017), the right of a state to ban full-face covering 
specifically in favour of ‘living together’ was similarly conferred by the Court on 
Belgium, a state which is not however similarly constitutionally-determined as a secular 
state. 
Further extending its sanctioning of French bans on religious dress, in Ebrahimian v. 
France (2015), regarding the non-renewal of the contract of a social worker as a result 
of patients complaining about her wearing headscarf, the Court ruled that Ebrahimian’s 
religious freedom was justifiably restricted for the sake of preserving secularism and 
religious neutrality in work environments. Thus in this case the Court approves of 
the extension of the ban on headscarves in public schools to a ban on headscarves in 
the public sector in general, without any discussion as to whether this jump from the 
educational sphere to the public sector in general is necessary and referring simply to 
the rationale of the French system which, the Court says, it is not its role to assess. 
Finally, in Lachiri v. Belgium (2018), the ECtHR for the first time finds a violation 
in a case where the wearing of a headscarf by a Muslim woman was at stake. Here the 
claimant argued that her exclusion from a Belgian courtroom (where she was to act 
as a witness in a case) on the ground that she wore a hijab amounted to a breech of 
Art.9. The Court agreed, notably indicating that the Belgian state did not claim the 
ban was aimed at preserving secular or democratic values (and thus leaving open the 
interpretation, then, that had the state claimed the ban was for protecting secularism, 
then the Court would have found in favour of the state) (see Ringelheim 2018). The 
ban was instead justified by the Belgian state on the grounds of ‘protection of public 
order’, but the Court did not find any real threat to public order in Lachiri’s wearing of 
the headscarf in the courtroom. 
Religious political party closure
Refah Partisi v. Turkey (2003) is in a category to its own, because it is the only case 
to do with a closure of an Islamist political party (the follow up Fazilet v. Turkey case 
was withdrawn, with a rather heavy letter to the Court indicating that after Refah and 
Sahin there was little hope for their case; see Gulalp 2019: 149). It also stands out 
from the present presentation of cases in that it does not engage Art.9 on religious 
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freedom (it rests instead on Art.11 regarding the right to association). But it is worthy 
of careful consideration because the case communicates an especially powerful message 
regarding Islam  in relation to democracy. In Refah the Court considered the decision 
of the Turkish Constitutional Court to close down the ruling political party Refah, on 
the grounds that it was a ‘centre of activities against the principle of secularism’. The 
ECtHR ruled unanimously that actions and speeches by Refah leaders showed the 
party had a long-term aim to set up a regime based on sharia. In the Court’s estimation, 
‘in the past political movements based on religious fundamentalism have been able 
to seize political power in certain States’ (para.124; note that Refah achieved, did not 
seize, power through elections), and the establishment of a theocratic regime was not 
completely inconceivable in Τurkey, ‘account being taken of recent Turkish history 
and, secondly, of the fact that the great majority of its population are Muslims’ (paras. 
95 and 125). As in the cases of Dahlab and Sahin, here too we find rather essentialised 
notions of Islam being expressed by the Court. This is most conspicuously the case 
in its handling of sharia law: ‘the Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects 
the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles 
such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms 
have no place in it’ (para.123). In short, the Court here expresses the view that the fact 
that Turkey has a majority Muslim population makes the establishment of a theocratic 
regime more likely, and that sharia is ‘stable and invariable’ and antithetical to pluralism.
Minaret ban
Like the case of Refah, the case of Ouardiri v. Switzerland (2011) on the minaret ban is 
in a category to its own, but worth mentioning for the controversiality of the topic at 
the time. The case concerned the Swiss ban on the minaret introduced into Swiss law 
in 2009, following a highly publicised campaign and referendum ‘against the building 
of minarets’. The campaign included posters suggesting a proliferation of minarets 
in Switzerland whilst in reality there were only 4 across the country at the time. The 
Court’s decision was one of inadmissibility, because the claimant could not claim to be a 
direct victim of the minaret ban. But it is notable nonetheless because the ban garnered 
so much attention and the Court’s pronouncement on it was eagerly anticipated. That 
pronouncement, empty of content though it was and based on consistently applied 
legal reasoning (lack of direct victimhood of claimant), may still be considered as 
having communicated a powerful message of a lack of the Court’s willingness to defend 
the right of Muslim communities to have mosques with minarets. It may also have 
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communicated to some observers a more  message of Court unwillingness to engage in 
such a controversial issue of ‘Islam v. Christian-majority state’ 6.
Legal status issues 
A number of cases on these issues has arisen especially from amongst Alevi groups in 
Turkey, because their lack of recognised legal status disadvantaged them significantly 
in terms of their rights to operate places of worship, or to enjoy tax exemptions similar 
to those for Sunni Islam, or to have their perspective taken into consideration in the 
teaching of religious education in public schools. These include Zengin v. Turkey 
(2007), Yalcin v. Turkey (2014), Cem Vakfı v. Turkey (2014), Sofuoglu and others v. 
Turkey (2014), and Dogan v. Turkey (2016) and critically, in each of these the Turkish 
state is judged by the Court as in violation of freedoms secured by the ECHR. The 
judgements in these cases, when considered alongside the other cases against the state of 
Turkey presented above, suggest the Court treats Islam differently when pitted against 
secularism, on the one hand, and when expressed as a minority position within a 
majority Muslim context, on the other.
Sharia law
Finally, in this selective list, one of the Court’s most recent and notable engagements 
with Islam is in the case of Molla Sali v. Greece (2018). This case concerned the claim 
of religion-based discrimination of Molla Sali, a resident of the Western Thrace region 
of Greece where, due to the conditions of a population exchange between Greece and 
Turkey set out in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, sharia courts prevailed over secular 
courts in matters of family law for the Muslim population in the region.  The civil will 
of Molla Sali’s husband was thus contested by the deceased’s sisters on the grounds that 
Islamic law – according to which 2/3rds of the estate would go to the sisters – should 
govern this matter of inheritance. Here the Court ruled in Molla Sali’s favour, indicating 
that the government’s refusal to allow members of a religious minority the right to 
voluntarily opt for and benefit from ordinary law was not only discriminatory but also 
breeches the right to free self-identification (i.e., the right to choose not to be treated as 
a member of a minority; see para.157).
6 One may of course only hypothesize about messages potentially received by different sec-
tors of a population in a given context. As Galanter explains (1983: 126), ‘a single judicial 
action may radiate different messages to different audiences’.
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Scholarly critique 
Clearly the presented case law offers much basis for criticism. Here I focus on three 
main lines of criticism embedded in much of the relevant scholarly literature. The 
first is that through its Islam-related jurisprudence, the Court has treated secularism 
as an ‘extra-conventional goal’. As Kayaoglu notes, secularism is not listed as one of 
the potential limitations to the Article 9-guaranteed enjoyment of the Freedom of 
Religion or Belief, and secularism is not mentioned in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (2014). Yet the Court has appeared willing to renounce some of 
the requirements of democracy (e.g., guarantee of religious freedom) in favour of 
the principle of secularism (McCrea 2013). It does so perhaps most conspicuously 
in the Refah case, where it held that the right of states to defend liberal democracy 
encompasses measures to protect the secularity of the state and the separation of religion 
and politics. 
A second major critique regarding the Court’s handling of Islam is that it exercises 
a double-standard as compared with its treatment of Christianity. Indeed, rather 
conspicuously, secularism as a goal does not factor in the same way in case law to do 
with majority Christianity. The Court’s interventions go beyond just defending a state’s 
right to a secular regime (as in the Turkish case or, with a stretch, in defending ‘living 
together’ as a French state principle), to - as we have seen in cases such as Dahlab and 
Sahin – communicating normative and essentialised statements about Islam. As posited 
in the introductory chapter to one of the most thorough treatments of the Court’s 
engagements with Islam (Durham et al 2012: 2): ‘Are the remedies available under the 
key European human rights instruments … as effective for those whose beliefs, culture 
and identities are rooted in Islam as they are for other inhabitants of Europe?’. 
The contrast is particularly striking when considering the case of Dahlab in which, as 
noted above, the Court described the headscarf as a ‘powerful external symbol’, in spite 
of no complaints to that effect (and thus no evidence suggesting it was impacting upon 
students’ perspectives in any way), in comparison with those of Eweida and Others v. 
United Kingdom (2013), and Lautsi v. Italy (2011). In Eweida, and after a long string 
of cases in which the Court upheld states’ headscarf bans, the UK was reprimanded 
by the ECtHR for defending British Airways in asking a woman not to visibly wear 
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her Christian cross necklace 7. And in Lautsi, the claim of an atheist parent that the 
presence of the crucifix on Italian school walls violates her right to educate her children 
in accordance with her own religious or philosophical beliefs (enshrined in ECHR 
Art.2 of Protocol 1) was rejected by the Court, which accepted instead the Italian state’s 
description of the crucifix as a ‘passive’ religious symbol unthreatening to parents’ rights 
to educate their children in accordance with their own religious or philosophical beliefs, 
in spite of (and unlike in Dahlab) there having been complaints to that effect. 
The Lautsi case leads us to a third major critique against the Court for its handling 
of Islam: that it places politics over religion. The Court’s final decision in Lautsi was 
reached in 2011 by its Grand Chamber, after a chamber’s original 2009 judgement 
which found unanimously (7-0) in favour of Lautsi. That judgement was reversed 
rather dramatically by the Court’s Grand Chamber (15-2), after an intensive backlash 
across several states, embodied in an unprecedented number of national governmental 
interventions in the case (10, all in favour of the Italian state), as well as multiple 
interventions by NGOs (10, 6 of which supported the Italian state’s arguments), and 
by 33 members of the European Parliament (all in support of the defendant state) (on 
Lautsi see Mancini 2010; Liu 2011; Ronchi 2011; Fokas 2015; Ringelheim 2014). If 
the lens on Lautsi is widened, we give due attention to the reform process which the 
Court was undergoing and to the particularly sharp direction the latter was taking 
whilst the UK was at the helmof the Council of Europe (the ‘Brighton Process’; see 
Christoffersen and Madsen 2013; Fokas 2016). That reform process entailed national 
governments’ efforts to reign in what many described as the Court’s infringements on 
national sovereignty. And it converged, temporally, with UK threats to withdraw from 
convention system over what it saw as the Court overstepping its bounds especially over 
the Hirst v. UK (2004) case on prisoner’s voting rights. The timing of the mobilisations 
aiming for Lautsi’s reversal coincided with these developments – and in interviews 
with ECtHR judges and former judges, several indicated that the Lautsi reversal was 
influenced by this broader climate. The ‘Lautsi effect’ has also been described as having 
had an influence over the S.A.S. judgement, in that the Court was more reserved in 
7 It should be noted however that three other Christianity-based claims against the UK which 
the Court considered alongside that of Eweida were not supported by the Court: these are 
the claims of Ms. Chaplin, a nurse asked for reasons of health and safety to remove her Chris-
tian cross necklace; Ms Ladele, a registrar who on religious grounds refused to have (same-
sex) civil partnership duties assigned to her; and Mr McFarlane, a counseller who refused to 
give psycho-sexual therapeutic counselling to same-sex couples.
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Lautsi’s aftermath regarding issues which involve politically sensitive issues as is religion 
(Fokas 2016). 
Similarly, the Refah and Sahin decisions were widely seen as heavily influenced 
by political considerations. One major relevant factor was Turkey’s pending EU 
membership, which it was still pursuing actively at the time of those cases. Another 
is the fact that the timing of these cases coincided broadly with that of France’s 
introduction of its headscarf bans in schools.
Of course, also key is the ‘margin of appreciation’ which the Court affords to states 
in determining whether a particular restriction of a right is required (‘necessary in a 
democratic society’) in the given circumstance (Evans 2001: 142). In the religious 
freedoms context where, according to Evans (2001: 143), the margin tends to be 
particularly wide, the margin of appreciation is a substantial tool through which the 
Court allows states a certain, variable, leeway to interpret religious rights and freedoms 
within the broader context of their national cultures and traditions. Julie Ringelheim 
(2012: 306) suggests that the large discretion that the Court tends to grant to national 
authorities on religion cases is ‘symptomatic of its difficulty in dealing with them’. Most 
likely by ‘them’ Ringelheim means the religion cases, but there’s a strong case for saying 
the margin of appreciation is also symptomatic of the Court’s difficulty dealing with the 
states and their potential backlash and thus political in nature. 
Enter the CJEU: hope for venue shoppers?  
Against the backdrop of the questionable record of the Court in its handling of Islam-
related claims, many welcomed the idea that the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) might be an alternative venue where some such issues could be 
addressed 8. The EU formally extended its competence to the protection of fundamental 
rights through its 2000 Charter on Fundamental Rights. And the CJEU entered the 
realm of religion-related case law especially through the 2000/78 equality directive 
which establishes a general framework for equal treatment specifically (and exclusively, 
8 See Fokas 2016 for interview-based research with social actors with a vested interest in reli-
gion-related case law.
135Effie Fokas
unfortunately) in employment and occupation settings 9. This directive was applied, 
with somewhat varied reasoning, to two headscarf cases addressed by the CJEU 
(notably, the first cases on religious discrimination to which this directive was applied 
by the CJEU).
In Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions [C-157/15], the CJEU addressed the claim of Achbita 
who had worked for three years as a receptionist and after the 3rd year informed 
them that she intended to start wearing an Islamic headscarf during working hours. 
G4S had an unwritten rule that workers could not wear visible signs of their political, 
philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace, and she was told she could not 
wear it, and was fired when she refused to remove it. The Belgian Court of Cassation 
asked the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on: ‘should Art 2(2) of Directive 2000/78 be 
interpreted as meaning that the prohibition on wearing, as a female Muslim, a headscarf 
at the workplace does not constitute direct discrimination where the employer’s rule 
prohibits all employees from wearing outward signs of political, philosophical and 
religious beliefs at the workplace?
In the case of Bougnaoui v. Micropole Univers SA [C-188/15], Bougnaoui was a design 
engineer whose work included going to customer’s sites, and her employer told her 
to remove her headscarf when visiting clients because one client had complained 
about it. She refused and was dismissed. French Court of Cassation: ‘Must Art4 (1) 
of Directive 2000/78 be interpreted as meaning that the wish of a customer of an info 
tech consulting co no longer to have the information tech services of that company 
provided by an employee, a design engineer, wearing an Islamic headscarf, is a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement, by reason or the nature of the particular 
occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out?
Two Advocates General of the CJEU – Juliane Kokott (Achbita) and Eleanor Sharpston 
(Bougnaoui) gave divergent opinions on the respective questions. In Kokott’s opinion, in 
Achbita there was no discrimination, because the rule was equally applicable to people 
of any faith. Kokott’s opinion was rather provocative in indicating: 
9 The 2000/43 equality directive on racial and ethnic discrimination has a broader remit, cov-
ering not only employment but also healthcare, social security, education, public housing, 
etc.
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if a ban such as that at issue here proved to be based on stereotypes or 
prejudice in relation to one or more specific religions – or even simply in 
relation to religious beliefs generally…then it would without any doubt 
be appropriate to assume the presence of direct discrimination based on 
religion 10. 
The approach seemed blind to the social reality in Belgium, one of the countries to 
have introduced a ban on full face veils in all public spaces and where the ban at issue at 
Achbita’s company was highly likely to be based on stereotypes and prejudice. Further, 
Kokott suggested that the employer should offer the employee a position which does 
not require contact with customers. This too is rather provocative, literally suggesting 
that religion should be hidden, at best, and that it is ok that Muslim women who 
chose to cover their heads would be limited – extremely limited – in their employment 
possibilities (non-visible, backroom roles).
The CJEU in the end found indirect discrimination in this case, but ultimately deemed 
that discrimination justifiable: ‘the desire to display, in relations with both public and 
private sector customers, a policy of political, philosophical or religious neutrality must 
be considered legitimate’, because it relates to the freedom to conduct a business as 
guaranteed by Art 16 of the Charter. The judgement is criticised because the rule does 
not apply equally between people of faith and people of no faith. Further, the CJEU’s 
approached hinged on the idea that it is acceptable for a company to wish to maintain 
(and project) a religiously neutral image. But as Eva Brems et al have argued, extending 
neutrality to the private sector is a ‘big leap’, - and ‘neutrality can be an easy cover-up 
for prejudice’ (Brems et al 2017). 
Also highly controversially, Kokott opined that 
unlike sex, skin colour, ethnic origin, sexual orientation, age or a person’s 
disability, the practice of religion is not so much an unalterable fact as 
an aspect of an individual’s private life, and one, moreover, over which 
the employees concerned can choose to exert an influence. While an 
employee cannot ‘leave’ his sex, skin colour, ethnicity, sexual orientation, 
age or disability ‘at the door’ upon entering his employer’s premises, 
10 See http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=179082&doclang=en
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he may be expected to moderate the exercise of his religion in the 
workplace... 11
Sharpston’s opinion in the case of Bougnaoui was nearly opposite on that matter:
to someone who is an observant member of a faith, religious identity 
is an integral part of that person’s very being … it would be entirely 
wrong to suppose that, whereas one’s sex and skin colour accompany one 
everywhere, somehow one’s religion does not 12. 
Ultimately in Bougnaoui the CJEU found evidence of discrimination, in indicating that 
a customer’s wish not to deal with a person wearing a headscarf is insufficient to make 
not wearing a headscarf a ‘General Occupational Requirement’.
Thus far, then, the messaging of the CJEU on Islam, insofar as the wearing of religious 
symbols is concerned at least, in one case communicates a prioritization of business 
interests over religious freedom for Muslim minorities, and in the other places a (not 
particularly strict) limit on that prioritization. Certainly, as a result of these two cases, at 
least some of the aforementioned hope in the CJEU was thwarted.
This court has not yet been called upon to address discrimination with regards to 
Christian or other religious symbols, thus we do not have a comparative perspective in 
this regard. However, the CJEU has addressed cases regarding majority and minority 
Christian priviledge and the right to religious autonomy of Christian churches. In 
one such case the CJEU addressed the Austrian state’s classification of Good Friday 
as a public holiday only for members of three particular Christian minority churches, 
resulting in the privileging of members of those churches with a paid holiday on Good 
Friday or additional pay if they worked on that day [C-193/17; see CJEU Press Release 
No.4/19]. The CJEU here engaged with the question of whether a measure intended 
to benefit the adherents to a minority faith amounts to illegal direct discrimination 
against those who are not a member of that minority (McCrea 2019), and found in a 22 
January 2019 ruling that this policy violates the EU equality directive 2000/78.
11 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=179082&doclang=en
12 See https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-07/cp160074en.pdf
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In two other cases referred to the CJEU by German national courts, the court dealt 
with religion-based discrimination of (potential) employees by a church-based employer. 
One was raised by Vera Egenberger, a not religiously affiliated woman who claimed she 
had been discriminated against in her application for a position advertised as requiring 
membership in a Protestant church or a church affiliated with the Working Group of 
Christian Churches in Germany, though the work entailed ‘had very little to do with 
churches’ (Ciacchi 2019) 13 [C-414/16]. The second case concerned the termination 
of the employment contract of a man (‘JQ’) working for a private institution (‘IR’) 
dependent on the Catholic Church and who had remarried after divorce but without 
prior annulment of his first marriage by a church tribunal [C-68/17]. The German 
General Law on Equal Treatment allows significant excemptions for church-based 
employers based on the ‘self-perception of the religious society or association concerned, 
in view of its right of self-determination or because of the type of activity’ (Para.9, cited 
by Ciacchi 2019: 297). The CJEU rejected the subjective (‘self-perception’) perspective 
on church-based organisations’ rights to exceptions from non-discrimination legislation 
with reference to ‘objectively dictated’ occupational requirements (for Vera Egenberger) 
and ‘effective judicial review’ over any decisions regarding the impact of the faith or lack 
thereof of employees on their performance of managerial duties (in the case of JQ) (see 
Ciacchi 2019 for further analysis).
Lucy Vickers (2017) describes the CJEU headscarf cases as a ‘backwards step’ in terms 
of equality which ‘can best be understood in the context of a deeper reluctance on the 
part of the CJEU to address issues of state sovereignty which arise when considering 
the highly contentious question of the proper scope of protection for religion or belief 
in Europe’. By this reading, the CJEU has in common with the ECtHR a sensitivity 
to political concerns.  But the latter three cases presented here, concerning Christian 
majority or minority claims, tentatively suggest the CJEU’s willingness to contend with 
states’ traditional approaches to Christian minorities or majorities when the latter are 
in breach of the equality directive. Arguably however, the political sensitivities around 
Islam are more often than not greater than those around Christian majority or minority 
privilege. Further, it must be noted regarding the CJEU preliminary reference procedure 
that – as compared with the ECtHR – the CJEU has a rather limited competence: 
according to the EU treaty article establishing this procedure (Art.267), it is at the 
13 As Ciacchi notes, rather ironically the post consisted of writing reports on German efforts 
to combat discrimination in the framework of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination. (295).
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national court’s discretion whether to ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling on a 
particular question; the obligation to refer a question to the CJEU only arises ‘Where 
any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a Member 
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law,’ (Art.267 
TFEU para.3). 
Concluding remarks
Realistically speaking, issues around Islam and law in Europe are bound to be politically 
fraught, just as issues around religion in the public sphere in general are increasingly 
politically fraught. As Ronan McCrea (2017) indicates, ‘ the question of religion’s 
role in society has become bound up with highly combustible political issues such as 
migration, changing norms in relation to gender and sexuality, national identity and 
even national security’.  However, when considering the treatment of Islam specifically, 
it is difficult not to see the latter as qualitatively different to that of other faiths.
In the case of the CJEU, there is yet fairly little evidence to go by: though that court has 
considerable experience with prohibition of discrimination in the employment context, 
its experience of dealing with religion-based discrimination is thus far fairly limited 
(O’Leary 2018; Pastor 2016). As such it has also not, yet, become a significant ‘target’ 
of national governments’ ire regarding the supranational court’s overstepping of their 
national sovereignty specifically to do with regulation of religion; the two courts are not 
evenly exposed to political pressures in these domains.
In the case of the ECtHR, however, it has actively engaged with religion-related case 
law claims at least since 1993, when it issued its first judgment finding a violation 
of religious freedom on the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece. It was not long after that it 
addressed religious autonomy claims of Muslim minorities in Greece and Bulgaria (e.g., 
Serif v. Greece, 1999; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, 2000); in such cases the ECtHR 
ruled in favour of the Muslim claims. But there seems to be a difference in the Court’s 
approach to cases to do with outward expressions of Muslim identity and with Muslim 
challenges to state secularisms, and this difference is not limited to the past decade’s 
‘high combustibility’ of religion-related issues in the context of new nationalisms and 
turns towards particularism, both in Europe and globally.  
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As Siofra O’Leary (2018) notes, a further fundamental difference between the ECtHR 
and the CJEU is that the former rules in a fact specific and country specific way: each 
case it takes is judged on the basis of the specifics of the facts of the case in question, 
and in relation to the relevant laws in the given country context. The CJEU, on the 
other hand, is engaged to provide general interpretative guidance to courts in the now 
27 Member States; its rulings are neither case nor country specific. 
If, however, we return to the question of the ‘indirect’ or ‘radiating’ effects of courts, 
then beyond the impact of court decisions whether specific to the facts of a case and 
the country in question, or directly relevant to all 27 member states of the EU, the 
messages that court decisions communicate more broadly to society at large are far 
more important in terms of potential impact on peoples’ perceptions of their rights. 
To date there is no systematic comparative study of these two courts’ indirect effects 14, 
one may assume that the sheer volume of relevant case law at the ECtHR as compared 
with the CJEU entails far greater indirect effects of the former in terms of stakeholders’ 
conceptions of their rights. In the case of both European level courts, however, it is 
safe to say that the overall message communicated to Muslims thus far is less than 
encouraging in terms of these Courts’ concerns for protection of their rights to manifest 
their faith in public and, in some cases, in the private business sphere.
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